Mercer Law Review
Volume 68
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 9

12-2016

Domestic Relations
Barry B. McGough
Elinor H. Hitt
Katherine C. McGuire

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
McGough, Barry B.; Hitt, Elinor H.; and McGuire, Katherine C. (2016) "Domestic Relations," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 68 : No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol68/iss1/9

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
Elinor H. Hitt**
and Katherine C. McGuire***
This Article addresses significant case law that arose in Georgia domestic relations law from June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016.1
I. PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Two cases reviewed this survey period involved enforcement of prenuptial agreements. In determining whether a prenuptial agreement
should be enforced, trial judges should use three criteria: "(1) was the
agreement obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or through ....
nondisclosure of material facts? (2) is the agreement unconscionable? (3)
[h]ave the facts and circumstances changed since the agreement Was ex2
ecuted, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?"
The first criterion, full and fair disclosure of assets, was at issue in
both cases. In Kwon v. Kwon, 3 following the husband's death, the administrator of his estate sought to have the prenuptial agreement at issue
enforced, an action opposed by the wife. At trial, evidence established

* Partner in the firm of Warner Bates, Atlanta, Georgia. University of California at
Berkley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Senior Associate in the firm of Warner Bates, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S.Ed., 1993); University of Georgia (M.S.W., 1996); Georgia State University School
of Law (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Warner Bates, Atlanta, Georgia. University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (B.A., 2008); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2012). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law during the prior survey period,
see Barry B. McGough, Elinor H. Hitt & Katherine S. Cornwell, Domestic Relations, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 67 MERCER L. REV. 47 (2015).
2. Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 641, 292 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1982).
3. 333 Ga. App. 130, 775 S.E.2d 611 (2015).
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that both the husband and wife owned assets when the prenuptial agreement was executed that were not listed in the agreement, and that the
husband did not tell the wife what he owned prior to the execution of the
agreement. 4 The trial court concluded the husband's failure to disclose
his assets rendered the agreement unenforceable. 5
On appeal, the estate administrator argued the wife did not prove that
the husband owned any assets unknown to the wife when she signed the
agreement.6 However, this argument was futile, because the party seeking enforcement has the burden of establishing there was a full and fair
disclosure of the assets of the parties prior to the execution of the agreement. 7 The administrator, not the wife, had the burden of proof. 8 The
administrator then argued the wife waived her right to challenge the adequacy of the disclosure because the prenuptial agreement provided "that
each party had made 'a substantially accurate disclosure' of all assets to
the other, did not want an independent audit of the other's assets, and
'specifically waives and relinquishes any right to obtain further
knowledge with regard to said holdings."'9 The administrator maintained that a full and fair disclosure was achieved via this waiver.10 The
Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed, and it found this language did not
constitute a waiver of the wife's right to challenge the adequacy of the
husband's disclosure and upheld the lower court. 1
In Dodson v. Dodson,12 the trial court found the parties' prenuptial
agreement was unenforceable due to nondisclosure of material facts after
the evidence established that no values for the husband's assets, including bank accounts and two closely held businesses, were listed in the prenuptial agreement, and that the husband did not allow the wife reasonable access to his personal or business bank accounts in order to obtain
values. The husband appealed, claiming the wife had a duty to inquire
and investigate with regard to the value of all of his assets, including
bank accounts.13 The reviewing court found this to be incorrect as a matter of fact and law. 14 Factually, the husband did not give the wife access
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Id. at 135-36, 775 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 136, 775 S.E.2d at 615.
Id. at 136, 775 S.E.2d at 616.
298 Ga. 117, 779 S.E.2d 638 (2015).
Id. at 119, 779 S.E.2d at 639.
Id.
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to his bank accounts by which the wife could have determined the accounts' values. 15 Legally, the spouse seeking enforcement must show
that the agreement contained full and fair disclosure of his or her material assets, and in the absence of full and fair disclosure, the other spouse
does not have a general duty to investigate the assets of the other party.16
The husband also argued he was only required to list his material assets, and was not required to apprise the wife of the value of his assets.
The Georgia Supreme Court again disagreed.' What is required is a "full
and fair disclosure."' 8 In this case, the disclosure was not full because
the wife did not know the value of the husband's assets, and it was not
fair because the husband did not allow the wife reasonable access to his
accounts to learn their values.' 9 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court. 20

II. JURISDICTION
Several cases arose during this survey period regarding jurisdictional
disputes under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA).21 The UCCJEA was promulgated to address "problems
of competing jurisdictions entering conflicting interstate child custody orders, forum shopping, and the drawn out and complex child custody legal
proceedings often encountered by parties [when] multiple states are involved." 22

Roach v. Breeden23 reversed a ruling by the Superior Court of Walker
County which found Walker County was found to be the more convenient
forum to litigate custody issues between the parties, and which legitimated the child and awarded sole legal custody to the mother. 24 The Juvenile Court of Knox County, Tennessee made an initial custody determination. The father still lived in Tennessee, and exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction remained with the Tennessee court until that court determined if a court in another state was a more appropriate and convenient
forum in which to hear the matter. The Tennessee court had made no

15. Id. at 119, 779 S.E.2d at 639-40.
16. Id. at 119, 779 S.E.2d at 640.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 119-20, 779 S.E.2d at 640.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 120, 779 S.E.2d at 640.
21. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-40 (2015).
22. Delgado v. Combs, 314 Ga. App. 419, 424, 724 S.E.2d 436, 440 (2012) (quoting
Friedman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 264 P.3d 1161, 1165 (Nev. 2011)).
23. 333 Ga. App. 839, 777 S.E.2d 689 (2015).
24. Id. at 839-41, 843, 777 S.E.2d at 689-91.
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such determination. 25 Accordingly, the trial court in Georgia lacked ju26
risdiction to modify the Tennessee order.
In Prabnarongv. Oudomhack,27 a custody dispute arose between the
minor child's father and maternal uncle following the mother's death.
The Superior Court of Gwinnett County improperly exercised emergency
jurisdiction by modifying a custody order from the state of Washington,
which had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the issue. Though
the child's maternal uncle contended that V.P.'s father "has threatened
28
to mistreat [V.P.] by removing her from everything she knows," and
V.P. signed an affidavit expressing vague concerns about her safety if
forced to relocate to Washington, emergency jurisdiction was not required to protect V.P.29
Pursuant to section 19-9-64(a) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 3 0 a court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state if the child is present in this state and it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because "the child .

.

. is subjected to or

31

The long-held standard is
threatened with mistreatment or abuse."
32
In Prabnarong,there
child.
the
whether there is immediate danger to
as alleged by the
facts
of
the
version
was no immediate danger under any
under O.C.G.A.
jurisdiction
emergency
uncle or V.P. sufficient to invoke
judgment.33
court's
lower
the
§ 19-9-64(a). The appellate court reversed
In Ward v. Smith, 34 enforcement of a foreign custody order was at issue. The initial custody determination regarding the parties' child, P.W.,
was made in 2006 by an Indiana court, which retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. In 2008, the mother and P.W. relocated
to Camden County, Georgia. In 2014, the father did not return P.W. to
Georgia after his Labor Day visit. On September 11, 2014, the mother
filed a Petition for Enforcement of Custody Determination in the Superior Court of Camden County, seeking, inter alia, to enforce the Indiana
order and to find the father in contempt. Also on September 11, 2014, the

25. Id. at 840, 843, 777 S.E.2d at 690-92.
26. Id. at 843, 777 S.E.2d at 691.
27. 334 Ga. App. 723, 780 S.E.2d 393 (2015).
28. Id. at 724, 780 S.E.2d at 395.
29. Id.
30. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-64(a) (2015).
31. Id.
32. Prabnarong,334 Ga. App. at 726-27, 780 S.E.2d at 396-97 (applying the standard
articulated in Rozier v. Berto, 230 Ga. App. 427, 496 S.E.2d 544 (1998)).
33. Id.
34. 334 Ga. App. 876, 780 S.E.2d 702 (2015).
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Camden County Court entered an order requiring the father to appear at
a hearing on September 25, 2014, and return P.W. to the jurisdiction of
the court so the mother could take custody. The father argued that Indiana retained continuing jurisdiction over the matter, and he did not turn
over the child. 35
On September 30, 2014, the Georgia and Indiana courts held a telephone conference, and the Indiana court surrendered jurisdiction to the
Georgia court. Following an October 7, 2014 hearing, the father was
found in contempt of the September 11, 2014 order for willfully refusing
to return P.W. to the jurisdiction of the court as ordered. 36
On appeal, the father argued the trial court erred in finding him in
contempt of the September 11, 2014, order because Indiana still had jurisdiction at the time.37 However, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-84(a) 38 provides that
"'a court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child
custody determination may issue a temporary order enforcing,' among
other things, '[a] visitation schedule made by a court of another state."'3 9
The court of appeals affirmed that, under the UCCJEA, an order for the
enforcement of a visitation agreement in a foreign custody determination
is not void because of the originating court's continued jurisdiction. 40

III. EQUITABLE DIVIsIoN OF PROPERTY
During this period, the Georgia Supreme Court decided three cases
regarding the application of the "source-of-funds" rule (the Rule) in equitably dividing property. 41 The Rule is a method employed by courts to
equitably divide property upon divorce by entitling a spouse who contributed non-marital property to an interest in said property in the ratio of
the non-marital investment to the total non-marital plus marital investment in the property. 42 After calculating and separating that spouse's interest, the remaining interest is marital property, subject to equitable
division. 43 In order to benefit from the Rule, there must be evidence of

35. Id. at 877, 780 S.E.2d at 703-04.
36. Id. at 877-78, 780 S.E.2d at 704.
37. Id. at 879-80, 780 S.E.2d at 705.
38. O.C.G.A. § 19-9-84(a) (2015).
39. Ward, 334 Ga. App. at 881, 780 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-9-84(a)).
40. Id. at 882, 884, 780 S.E.2d at 706, 708.
41. Flory v. Flory, 298 Ga. 525, 783 S.E.2d 122 (2016); Horton v. Horton, 299 Ga. 46,
785 S.E.2d 891 (2016); Mallard v. Mallard, 297 Ga. 274, 773 S.E.2d 274 (2015).
42. Maddox v. Maddox, 278 Ga. 606, 607, 604 S.E.2d 784, 786 (2004).
43. Id.
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appreciation of the property in relation to its fair market value during
the parties' marriage.44
In Mallard v. Mallard,45 the wife purchased a property in 2009, and
then transferred ownership of the property to herself and to the soon-tobe husband as joint tenants in 2011. The parties married in January
2012, and the husband paid off the $268,314 debt on the property with
his separate funds in April 2012. An appraisal of the fair market value of
the property during the divorce action Was $252,000. In awarding the
husband 100% of the residence, the trial court applied the Rule and held
that the husband's payment of the debt was not a gift to the marital estate. 46 The court reversed the trial court's decision on the basis that the
Rule was inapplicable because the property was joint property brought
into the marriage, not separate property, and that, based on his testi47
mony, the husband's payment of the debt was a gift to the marital unit.
In Flory v. Flory,48 both the husband and wife requested that the trial
court classify certain property as the separate property of each. Relying
on the maxim that "[he] who would have equity must do equity and must
give effect to all equitable rights of the other party respecting the subject
matter of the action," 49 the trial court found that the parties were "on
equal footing"50 and, therefore, each party's request for the separate property classification was granted.5 ' In reversing and remanding the order,
the court held the trial court was required to base the classification on a
legal principle, such as the Rule, and relying simply on equitable principles to classify the property was an error.52
3
In Horton v. Horton,5 the trial court granted the husband's motion for
a directed verdict as to equitable division during the parties' jury trial.
The wife appealed, arguing that there was evidence that she invested her
separate property funds in the house (owned by husband prior to the
marriage), and that the trial court erred in granting the husband's motion which stated that the house was the husband's separate property. 5
In affirming the trial court's grant of the husband's motion, the court

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Mallard, 297 Ga. at 277, 773 S.E.2d at 277.
297 Ga. 274, 773 S.E.2d 274 (2015).
Id. at 275-77, 773 S.E.2d at 276-77.
Id. at 278-79, 773 S.E.2d at 278-79.
298 Ga. 525, 783 S.E.2d 122 (2016).
Id. at 525, 783 S.E.2d at 123.
Id.
Id. at 525-26, 783 S.E.2d at 123.
Id. at 526-27, 783 S.E.2d at 123-24.
299 Ga. 46, 785 S.E.2d 891 (2016).
Id. at 46, 51, 785 S.E.2d at 893, 895.
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stated that the wife did not present the evidence required to apply the
Rule, because there was no evidence upon which to calculate wife's alleged investment, nor evidence of an appreciation in value.55
IV. CHILD CUSTODY
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court reviewed many child
custody cases during this period. Significant cases included issues of selfexecuting custody provisions, a custody action between a parent and a
third party, and grandparent visitation. Self-executing change of custody
provisions "allow for an automatic change in custody based on a future
event without any additional judicial scrutiny."56 If the child's best interests are not given paramount import, such a provision "must be
stricken as violative of Georgia public policy."5 7
In Ezunu v. Moultrie,56 the trial court awarded sole legal and physical
custody of the parties' two minor children to the mother. The father was
awarded limited visitation, starting with telephone calls and followed by
supervised visitation of short durations that gradually increased until
the father had the children every other weekend. The children's therapist
would implement the visitation and make decisions regarding when the
father's visitation durations would increase.5 9 The Georgia Court of Appeals determined the self-executing change of visitation provision impermissibly allowed material changes in visitation to occur without any judicial consideration of the children's best interests.6 0 Thus, the court
reversed the lower court's judgment in part and remanded to strike the
self-executing provision.61
Three months later, in Lester v. Boles, 62 the court of appeals gave guidance regarding appropriate self-executing changes of custody. The father
filed a petition to modify custody of the parties' five-year-old child. In
April 2014, the trial court ordered the mother and father alternate physical custody of their son on a weekly basis until he began first grade, after
which the child would live primarily with his mother and visit with his

55. Id. at 50, 785 S.E.2d at 895.
56. Lester v. Boles, 335 Ga. App. 891, 892, 782 S.E.2d 53, 55 (2015) (quoting Scott v.
Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 373, 578 S.E.2d 876, 878 (2003)).
57. Id. at 892, 782 S.E.2d at 55.
58. 334 Ga. App. 270, 779 S.E.2d 44 (2015).
59. Id. at 270, 779 S.E.2d at 45.
60. Id. at 273, 779 S.E.2d at 47.
61. Id.
62. 335 Ga. App. 891, 782 S.E.2d 53 (2016).
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father. On appeal, the father argued this was an improper self-executing
custody provision. 63
The court of appeals acknowledged that the provision in question was
64
self-executing; however, the analysis continued. First, the provision is
not open-ended or "conditioned upon the occurrence of some future event
that may never take place".65 Instead, it is a "custody change coinciding

66
with a planned event that will occur at a readily identifiable time." Sec-

ond, the triggering event is not an arbitrary change that may or may not
affect the child's best interests at some unknown date; instead, the event
is the child beginning first grade, at which time the trial court believed
67
the child would need more stability of having one primary residence.
The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision because the custody
68
provision at issue gave "paramount import to the child's best interests."
69 the Georgia Supreme Court addressed joint cusIn Stone v. Stone,
tody arrangements between a parent and a third party. As a result of the
parties' second divorce, the mother was found to be unfit, and the father
and maternal grandmother were awarded joint legal custody of the
child. 70 On the father's appeal, the supreme court reasoned that Georgia
statutory law supports joint custody arrangements only between parents,
72
and it reversed the lower court.71 O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(1) shows a recognition that joint custody considerations remain with the parents of the
child. 73 Further, O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(d)74 states an express desire to preserve the sharing of rights between parents and visitation with parents
and grandparents.7 5 The statutory definitions of joint legal custody and
76
joint physical custody are limited to include parents. Here, there was
a parent suitable to exercise custody of the child, and, where there is a
suitable parent, the statute does not allow parental power to be limited
by a joint custody arrangement.77 The lower court had no power to grant
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 891-92, 782 S.E.2d at 53-55.
Id. at 893, 782 S.E.2d at 55-56.
Id. at 893, S.E.2d at 56.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Dellinger v. Dellinger, 278 Ga. 732, 733, S.E.2d 734, 735 (2013)).
297 Ga. 451, 774 S.E.2d 681 (2015).
Id. at 452, 774 S.E.2d at 682.
Id. at 452, 774 S.E.2d at 681.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(1) (2015).
See id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(d) (2015).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3 (2015).
Stone, 297 Ga. at 452, 774 S.E.2d at 682.
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joint custody to the father and grandmother, and the award was vacated.7 8 However, contact between grandparents and grandchildren is
statutorily encouraged; O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3,79 otherwise known as the
"Grandparent Visitation Statute," provides a mechanism for the grant of
visitation rights to grandparents.8 0 In 2012, the Grandparent Visitation
Statute was amended in part to add subsection (d), which provides a more
favorable legal standard than is set forth in the remainder of the statute
for grandparents seeking visitation with the minor children of the grandparent's deceased, incapacitated, or incarcerated adult child.81 Two cases
reviewed by the Georgia Court of Appeals during the survey period focused on this subsection.
In Fielderv. Johnson,82 the grandparents filed an original action under
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 "seeking visitation with the minor child of their deceased daughter."83 The child was then living with her biological father
and adoptive mother. The trial court dismissed the grandparents' petition relying on the following: (1) subsection (b) of the statute, which provides that an original action for visitation is not authorized where the
parents of a minor child are not separated and the child is living with
both parents, and (2) Kunz v. Bailey,84 which clarified that the term "parents" in subsection (b) included adoptive parents. 5 The trial court also
reasoned subsection (d) only allows grandparents to file a petition for visitation where one parent has died, "resulting in a single parent situation." 6 The trial court found that the grandparents did not have stand-

ing to file their petition, as the child was living with two parents, and
subsection (d) did not apply.8 7 The appellate court disagreed with the
lower court's analysis of subsection (d), as nothing in the plain language
of the statute indicates that it only applies when the child has one living
parent.88 The appellate court further determined the lower court's reliance on subsection (b) was in error, as O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 had been
amended to provide relief for grandparents whose adult child has died,

78.
79.
panded
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 455, 774 S.E.2d at 683.
O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2015 & Supp. 2016). Effective July 1, 2016, this statute is exto also include great-grandparents and siblings. Id.
Stone, 297 Ga. at 455, 774 S.E.2d at 683.
O.C.G.A § 19-7-3(d) (2012).
333 Ga. App. 658, 773 S.E.2d 831 (2015).
Id. at 658, 773 S.E.2d at 832.
290 Ga. 361, 720 S.E.2d 634 (2012).
Fielder, 333 Ga. App. at 663, 773 S.E.2d at 835.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and such relief was expressly not precluded by the language of subsection
(b).8 9

In Vincent v. Vincent,90 the paternal grandparents sought visitation
rights with their incarcerated son's minor children. The trial court denied the grandparents' request for visitation, relying on O.C.G.A. § 19-73(c)(1), which provides that, "the court may grant any grandparent of the
child reasonable visitation rights if the court finds the health or welfare
of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and if the
best interests of the child would be served by such visitation." 9 1 However,
the petitioners' son was incarcerated, so the trial court should have relied
on subsection (d) of the statute, which provides that such visitation would
be granted if the court finds it would be in the best interest of the child,
92
instead of the less favorable "harmed unless such visitation is granted"
93
standard set forth in subsection (c). The court of appeals held that the
trial court applied the incorrect legal standard, and it vacated the trial
94
court's ruling.
V. CHILD SUPPORT
Three cases decided during the survey period addressed the specific
95
issue of past-due child support. In Medley v. Mosley, the court of appeals
held that it was not error for the trial court to award back child support
to the father for a period of time prior to entry of an order, since child
support obligations extend to both mothers and fathers, and since a custodial parent (here, the father) may seek back support for, at most, the
actual expenses paid by the parent during the time the noncustodial parent failed to pay. 96 However, the court remanded the order for recalculation of the support amount since, in determining what portion of the
amount expended must be borne by the noncustodial parent, a trial court
must follow the Child Support Guidelines to include a review of each parent's income, and the record did not reflect that the trial court applied
97
the Guidelines.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
333 Ga. App. 902, 777 S.E.2d 729 (2015).
Id. at 903, 777 S.E.2d at 730; O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3(c)(1).
Vincent, 333 Ga. App. at 904, 777 S.E.2d at 730.
Id.
Id. at 904, 905, 777 S.E.2d at 730, 731.
334 Ga. App. 589, 780 S.E.2d 31 (2015).
Id. at 593-94, 780 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 594, 780 S.E.2d at 35.
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In Moore v. McKinney,98 the trial court erred in entering a temporary
consent order on February 18, 2014, providing that the father's obligations to pay child support "terminated retroactively to January 31,
2014."99 The court of appeals reemphasized that a child support obligation may only be modified on a prospective basis. 100
In Jackson v. Sanders,101 the father filed a petition to modify custody,
and the mother filed a counterclaim seeking past-due child support. The
trial court denied the father's petition, awarded the mother $27,135 in
past-due child support, and increased the father's child support obligation. The father appealed. Regarding the past-due child support, prior to
the father filing his petition, the parties agreed that instead of the father
paying child support to the mother directly, he would pay an equivalent
amount to the child's new private school for the mother's one-half share
of the tuition. Despite both parties acknowledging the agreement, the
trial court ordered the father to pay $27,135 in past-due child support for
the months when he made payments to the school instead of to the
mother. 102 In reversing the trial court's award of past-due support, the
appellate court determined that the trial court was correct to refer to the
rule that parties can enter into an agreement modifying child support,
but the agreement will only be enforceable when made an order of the
court.103 However, the court stated there are certain "equitable exceptions" to said rule, including "situations where the mother has consented
to the father's voluntary expenditures as an alternative to his child support obligation."1 0 4 The court held the parties' agreement did not modify
the child support amount, but instead established an alternative payout
of the support in the same amount, and therefore, the equitable exception
applied.105
VI. CONTEMPT AND POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF

While many contempt and post-judgment cases were decided during
this period, three contempt cases and two post-judgment cases are of particular interest.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

335 Ga. App. 855, 783 S.E.2d 373 (2016).
Id. at 856, 783 S.E.2d 375.
Id.
333 Ga. App. 544, 773 S.E.2d 835 (2015).
Id. at 554-55, 773 S.E.2d at 845.
Id. at 555, 773 S.E.2d at 845.
Id. (quoting Daniel v. Daniel, 293 Ga. 466, 468, 238 S.E.2d 108, 110 (1977)).
Id. at 555-56, 773 S.E.2d at 845.
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In Coppedge v. Coppedge,106 the trial court held the father in contempt
based upon the fact that he paid decreased child support after the children stopped attending summer and after-school programs at a certain
school, St. Luke. The father appealed, arguing that the language of the
agreement only obligates him to pay summer and after-school care at St.
Luke and, therefore, he is not obligated to pay for child care obtained
outside of St. Luke. 107 In concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in holding the father in contempt, the Georgia Supreme Court
applied general rules of contract construction in order to decipher the
parties' intent regarding payment of child care, and, ultimately, it found
that the relevant language was too ambiguous to support a finding of the
father's willful contempt. 0 8
In Gooch v. Gooch, 09 contrary to the parties' divorce decree, the husband irrevocably designated his new wife (instead of his ex-wife) as the
beneficiary of survivor benefits. The trial court held that the husband
was in willful contempt, but no remedy currently existed to cure the contempt. 110 The wife appealed, and the supreme court reversed and remanded the trial court's order."' The supreme court held that evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to show remedies for the contempt were
currently available, and the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
devise a remedy for the contempt.112
In Froehlichv. Froehlich,113 the trial court found that the husband was
in willful contempt of the parties' divorce decree insomuch as the husband failed to "transfer or otherwise make available for use by [Wife] ...
one half of the Marriot[t] points accumulated .

.

. so long as they are ac-

cumulated."11 4 In response to the willful contempt, the trial court ordered
the husband to make an accounting of the accumulated points, transfer
50% of the same to the wife within twenty days, and to make an annual
accounting of future points each January and transfer them to the wife
each February.11 5 In affirming the trial court's order, the supreme court
held that the evidence, including the husband's testimony at the hearing,
supported the finding of a willful contempt, and that the relief fashioned
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by the court-including the additional annual accounting requirements-was reasonable and necessary and did not modify the decree, but
remedied the harm caused by the husband's contemptuous conduct. 116
Regarding post-judgment relief cases, in Robertson v. Robertson," 7 the
former husband and wife purchased real estate during the marriage and
later conveyed it to their daughter to prevent the parties' creditors from
obtaining a judgment against the property. The parties continued to reside there after the conveyance. The parties divorced in July 2008 and,
although the wife swore under oath that the marriage was irretrievably
broken, the parties continued to live together after the divorce and did
not divide the marital assets. In August 2008, the daughter conveyed the
home to the husband after the parties discovered she had mortgaged ten
acres of the real estate. In July 2009, the husband convinced the wife's
mother to move in with them and pay rent. In 2013, the husband remarried and demanded that the wife and her mother vacate the residence.
The wife and her mother brought an action to set aside the divorce decree
for enforcement of implied trust and for conversion of property. The trial
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the husband, and
the wife and her mother appealed. 118
The court of appeals held the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment in favor of the husband because the wife's motion fo set
aside was not filed within three years of the divorce, and no showing of
fraud was made to toll the limitations period since the wife willfully participated in the sham divorce.119 However, the court then reversed the
trial court's grant of summary judgment as to the wife's claim for enforcement of implied trust, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to said claim since the evidence showed the wife made
substantial investments in the property due to the husband's assurances
that the property was for both of them.1 20 The court held that a reasonable jury could find that permitting the husband to retain sole ownership
of the property would result in an inequitable windfall recovery to him
and that a constructive trust may be imposed to prevent said windfall. 121
In the post-divorce proceeding of Mermann v. Tillitski,122 the parties'
agreement incorporated into the divorce decree provided the wife would
"receive 50% of the Husband's SEP IRA as of the date of [the] agreement
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and shall have her pro rata share of all investment experience, including
earnings and losses," 23 that the wife would prepare the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) within thirty days of the date of the settlement agreement, and that the husband would review the QDRO prior to
submission to the court. The wife submitted the QDRO to the court four
years later, stating that the delay was due to the husband's failure to
cooperate, and the court signed the QDRO. Six months later, realizing
that the husband had not reviewed the QDRO, the wife filed a motion to
vacate the QDRO and enter one approved by the husband. At the hearing
on the wife's motion, the wife claimed that she had an interest in all gains
in the IRA accruing to the date of hearing, July 9, 2014. The trial court
disagreed, and ruled that the wife was not entitled to gains accruing after
thirty days following the date of the agreement, which was the deadline
for the wife to submit the QDRO. The wife appealed. 124
The supreme court reversed the trial court's order, holding the trial
court improperly modified a fixed division of the property as set forth in
the agreement and incorporated into the decree by imposing the artificial
thirty-day limit on the wife's interest in gains and losses on the IRA, and
the agreement was devoid of any language indicating that the wife's failure to prepare the QDRO would affect her right to obtain her pro rata
sharb of all investment experience in the IRA.125
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